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Message Text

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E.O. 11652: XGDS-3
TAGS: PARM, PNUC, GW, US
SUBJECT: GERMANY AND THE STRATEGIC OPTION

SUMMARY. THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC IS NOW INVOLVED IN AN UNPRECEDENTED MANNER IN DISCUSSIONS RELATING TO STRATEGIC AND THEATER NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THIS HAS
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HAPPENED BOTH ON ITS OWN INITIATIVE AND ON OURS. MOREOVER, WE ARE ITS PRINCIPAL CONSULTATION PARTNER.

ON SALT, THE FRG WILL ATTEMPT TO INFLUENCE THE NEGOTIATIONS TO AVOID, IN ITS EYES, HAVING STRATEGIC PARITY PURCHASED AT THE EXPENSE OF THE THEATER BALANCE. IT FEARS THAT ELEMENTS OF THE SOVIET

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BUILD-UP ARE BEING DROPPED FROM CONTROL AT THE STRATEGIC NEGOTIATIONS LEVEL DOWN TO THE THEATER LEVEL, AT THE SAME TIME THAT COUNTERVAILING WESTERN SYSTEMS ARE BEING LIMITED BY THE STRATEGIC TALKS.

ON THE ENHANCED RADIATION WEAPON, THE FRG IS STILL LOOKING FOR A FORMULA THAT WILL EASE THE DOMESTIC DEBATE, BUT APPEARS TO SUPPORT DEVELOPMENT OF THE WEAPON IF NO MEANINGFUL TRADE-OFFS CAN BE REACHED IN NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION, AND IF SOME COMMON DECISION CAN BE REACHED.

IN GENERAL, THE GERMANS WANT TO FIND TRADE-OFFS, IN SALT OR GAS, THAT WILL LIMIT SOVIET SYSTEMS TARGETED OR TARGETABLE AGAINST WESTERN EUROPE IN EXCHANGE FOR WEST EUROPEAN-BASED SYSTEMS, BUT THEY HAVE NOT YET MADE SPECIFIC DECISIONS ON HOW TO BRING SUCH TRADE-OFFS INTO BEING, OR ON WHAT PRECISELY TO INCLUDE.

THE GERMAN DILEMMA IS THAT, WITHOUT SALT, ALL DETENTE POLICY IS IN JEOPARDY FOR THE FRG AS WELL AS FOR US. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE GERMANS FEAR THE CONSEQUENCES IF THEY ARE OBLIGED TO TRY TO MAKE UP ANY THEATER OR CONVENTIONAL DEFICIENCIES OF THE MAGNITUDE THAT THEY SEE ARISING. THEY HOPE THAT THE CONSULTA-

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TIONS WILL FIND A WAY TO AVOID THIS DILEMMA.

THOUGH CERTAIN BASIC GERMAN STUDIES ON SALT HAVE BEEN COMPLETED, WE UNDERSTAND THEY ARE STILL WORKING ON DETAILED PAPERS. THE FEDERAL SECURITY COUNCIL HAS MET AGAIN LAST FRIDAY, AND WE WILL TRY TO LEARN MORE OF ITS DECISIONS. IN THE MEANTIME, WE ARE SUBMITTING THE FOLLOWING REPORT ON THE BASIS OF CONVERSATIONS WITH CHANCELLERY AS WELL AS DEFENSE AND FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIALS CONCERNED WITH DEFENSE AND GENERAL POLITICAL MATTERS, AS WELL AS SOME EXCHANGES WITH THE GERMAN DEFENSE INTELLECTUAL COMMUNITY. THIS CABLE WILL REPORT GERMAN ATTITUDES ON THE ER/RB WEAPON, SALT, POSSIBLE NEGOTIATING TRADE-OFFS, OBJECTIVES IN THE CURRENT CONSULTATIONS, AND THE DOMESTIC FALLOUT HERE. END SUMMARY.

1. THE YEAR 1977 SAW A SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN THE GERMAN ROLE REGARDING STRATEGIC NUCLEAR POLICY. FOR THE FIRST TIME SINCE ITS FORMATION, THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC HAS BEGUN TO PLAY A SIGNIFICANT IF INDIRECT ROLE IN EAST-WEST NEGOTIATIONS ON NUCLEAR MATTERS,

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BY ITS CONSULTATIONS WITH US ON SALT. FOR THE FIRST TIME SINCE THE ILL-FATED MLF, THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC IS BEING INVITED TO PLAY A ROLE IN THE DECISION ON A NUCLEAR WEAPONS SYSTEM, THE ER/RB WEAPON OFTEN CALLED THE NEUTRON BOMB.

2. PART OF GERMANY'S NEW ROLE HAS COME IN RESPONSE TO GERMAN DEMANDS; PART OF IT IN RESPONSE TO OURS. IN ITS TOTALITY, THE NEW ROLE MIRRORS THE INCREASINGLY VITAL ELEMENT THAT THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC CONTRIBUTES TO THE WESTERN DEFENSE STRUCTURE. IT ALSO REFLECTS NW PRESSURES ARISING IN THE WESTERN ALLIANCE SYSTEM IN RESPONSE TO THE SOVIET THEATER BUILD-UP.

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3. THE GERMANS ARE, PERHAPS NOT SURPRISINGLY, STILL UNCERTAIN HOLTO HANDLE THEIR NEW ROLE. TO A SIGNIFICANT EXTENT, IT HAS BROUGHT TO THE SURFACE SOME LONG-STANDING GERMAN RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE GENERAL TRENDS OF WESTERN DEFENSE DOCTRINE. IT HAS ALSO UNLEASHED A DOMESTIC DEBATE THAT COMPLICATES DECISION-MAKING. LAST BUT NOT LEAST, IT CAN PRODUCE STRAINS IN GERMAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS THAT CAN, IN TURN, AFFECT THE ACHIEVEMENT OF OTHER OBJECTIVES.

A.. THHE ENHANCED RADIATION WEAPON

4. GERMAN OFFICIALS HAVE COMMENTED TO US THAT, BY INVITING GERMANY TO DECIDE ON DEPLOYMENT OF THE ER/RB WEAPON BEFORE THE U.S. DECIDES ON PRODUCTION, THE UNITED STATES WAS ASKING THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC TO ACCEPT THE POLITICAL DISADVANTAGES OF BEING A NUCLEAR POWER ALTHOUGH THE FRG HAS LONG FOREGONE THE MILITARY ADVANTAGES. THEY HAVE ADDED THAT THEY HAD ALWAYS BEEN CONTENT WITH THE DISADVANTAGES AND ADVANTAGES OF CONVENTIONAL POWER, AND HAD BEEN CONTENT TO LIVE WITHOUT BEING A NUCLEAR POWER, BUT THAT THEY WERE UNCERTAIN OF HOW TO HANDLE THE NEW COMBINATION OF PRESSURES ALTHOUGH THEY FULLY RECOGNIZED THAT THE ER/RB WEAPON COULD BE A MAJOR ELEMENT IN A SUCCESSFUL DEFENSE OF WESTERN EUROPE.

5. THE WEAPON HAS, IN A VERY REAL SENSE, ALSO REAWAKENED, THOUGH NOT YET SURFACED, LONG-STANDING GERMAN CONCERNS ABOUT THE DOCTRINE OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE. THE OFTEN ALLEGED LIKELIHOOD THAT AN ER/RB WEAPON MIGHT BE USED MORE READILY THAN OTHER NU-

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CLEAR WEAPONS HAS REMINDED THEM THAT A EUROPEAN BATTLE WILL BE FOUGHT PRIMARILY ON GERMAN SOIL. THUS, GERMAN PROPOSALS FOR USING THE WEAPON AS AN INSTRUMENT IN NEGOTIATIONS ARE INFLUENCED IN PART BY THE DESIRE TO REDUCE THE NEED FOR ITS DEPLOYMENT AS WELL AS ITS USE. THIS IS ONLY ONE FACTOR IN DOMESTIC DEBATE WHICH HAS MADE THE CHANCELLOR SO SLOW TO ENDORSE DEPLOYMENT OF THE WEAPON. THE OTHER FACTOR IS MATHEMATICAL. WITH A NARROW MAJORITY IN THE BUNDESTAG, THE GOVERNMENT CANNOT AFFORD TO ALIENATE THOSE LEFT-WING SOCIAL DEMOCRATS WHO MIGHT STOP SUPPORTING THE GOVERNMENT, AND MIGHT EVEN VOTE AGAINST IT ON THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE THEY WOULD RATHER BE IN OPPOSITION THAN TO SHARE RESPONSIBILITY FOR WHAT HAS BEEN MISLABELED THE "CAPITALIST WEAPON."

6. DESPITE THESE PROBLEMS, WE CONTINUE TO GET THE IMPRESSION THAT THE SENIOR POLITICAL FIGURES IN THE FRG ARE PREPARED TO HAVE THE ER/RB WEAPON DEPLOYED IN THE FRG IF SOME WAY CAN BE FOUND TO DEFUSE THE POLITICAL PRESSURE. IF THE UNITED STATES WILL NOT TAKE THE FIRST STEP (A PRODUCTION DECISION) ALONE, AS THE GERMANS WOULD PREFER, THE GERMANS MIGHT BE READY TO JOIN IN AN ARRANGEMENT WHEREBY ALL DECISIONS ARE ANNOUNCED TOGETHER. IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT FOR THEM, HOWEVER, TO REDUCE THE OPTICAL LINK BETWEEN THE TWO DECISIONS TO THE EXTENT THAT THEY CANNOT BE CHARGED WITH HAVING CONTRIBUTED TO THE DECISION ON PRODUCTION, SINCE SUCH A STEP WOULD GO AGAINST THEIR POLICY (WHICH WE ENDORSE) OF NON-INVOLVEMENT IN NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

SALT AND THE BALANCE IN EUROPE

7. FOR THOSE WHO HAVE LONG WONDERED WHAT POLITICAL IMPACT SOVIET WEAPONS DEPLOYMENTS MIGHT COME TO HAVE

ON WESTERN EUROPE, THE GERMAN ATTITUDE TOWARD THE SALT NEGOTIATIONS CAN SERVE AS A CASE STUDY. FOR IT IS THE SOVIET SS-20'S AND BACKFIRE BOMBERS THAT HAVE SPARKED GERMAN DESIRES FOR CONSULTATIONS WITH US ABOUT THE COURSE OF THE SALT TALKS.

8. THE GERMANS BELIEVE THAT THE TRIAD REMAINS VALID,

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AND THAT THE AMERICAN NUCLEAR DETERRENT REMAINS ESSENTIAL TO THE SAFETY OF THE ALLIANCE. WHAT DISTURBS THEM IS THAT ELEMENTS SHIFTING BETWEEN VARIOUS LEVELS OF THE TRIAD ARE CONTRIBUTING TO AN IMBALANCE IN EUROPE.

9. AS THE GERMANS SEE IT, THE IMPACT OF CURRENT SALT TALKS ON THE TRIAD IS AS FOLLOWS:

-- AT THE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR LEVEL: HERE, THE UNITED STATES HAS INTRODUCED THE CRUISE MISSILE AS A DETERRENT ELEMENT (ON THE B-52'S) BUT ALSO AS A NEGOTIATING ELEMENT (IN THE SALT PROTOCOL). ON THE OTHER HAND, THE UNITED STATES HAS PERMITTED THE SOVIETS TO REMOVE THE BACKFIRE BOMBERS FROM THIS LEVEL (THOUGH LIMITING PRODUCTION) AS WELL AS THE SS-20 (BY INSISTING THAT NO THIRD STAGE BE ADDED). THUS, THE BALANCE AT THE GLOBAL LEVEL CAN BE MAINTAINED, BUT ONLY AT THE COST OF THE OTHER BALANCES.

-- AT THE THEATER NUCLEAR LEVEL: HERE THE BIGGEST PRICE HAS BEEN PAID, IN GERMAN EYES, FOR THE STRATEGIC BALANCE. THE GERMANS BELIEVE THAT, BY LIMITING THE RANGE OF THE GLCM'S AND SLCM'S, THE UNITED STATES HAS SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCED THEIR VALUE AS THEATER WEAPONS AND AS DETERRENTS, EVEN IF ONLY TEMPORARILY. MORE SERI-

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OUSLY, HOWEVER, BY PERMITTING THE BACKFIRE AND THE SS-20 TO DROP FROM THE STRATEGIC TO THE THEATER LEVEL, THE US ALLOWS THE SOVIETS FREE DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF THESE WEAPONS AGAINST WESTERN EUROPE. ONE DEFENSE MINISTRY OFFICIAL TOLD US THAT, EVEN AT LIMITED DEPLOYMENT RATES, THERE WILL BE ENOUGH BACKFIRES TO OBLITERATE EUROPE WHEN THE SALT PROTOCOL AND THE SLCM AND GLCM LIMITS EXPIRE (EVEN THOUGH, OF COURSE, WE COULD NOT ANYWAY DEPLOY THEM EARLIER).

-- AT THE CONVENTIONAL LEVEL: HERE, THE GERMANS SEE A CONTINUING SOVIET BUILD-UP WHICH CONVINCES THEM THAT, AS THE SOVIETS ACHIEVE STRATEGIC PARITY, THEY ARE DETERMINED TO USE THE COVER OF THAT PARITY IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE OVERWHELMING SUPERIORITY IN EUROPE.

10. ON THE BASIS OF THIS ANALYSIS, THE GERMANS FEAR THAT SOVIET STRATEGIC EQUALITY WILL GIVE THE SOVIET UNION THE CAPACITY TO LIMIT A CONFLICT TO THE FEBA, OR AT LEAST TO THE EUROPEAN THEATER, WHERE IT WILL HAVE ABSOLUTE SUPERIORITY, AND WILL ALSO REDUCE SOVIET RELUCTANCE TO START, OR TO THREATEN TO START,

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A CONFLICT. ONE PLANNER HAS RECALLED FOR US KHRUSHCHV'S ROCKET THREAT AGAINST EUROPE, AND SAID THAT THE GERMANS HAVE NOT FORGOTTEN THIS.

11. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THERE IS NO GERMAN OFFICIAL OR INTELLECTUAL WHO BELIEVES THAT THE CRUISE MISSILE CAN BE EFFECTIVE AGAINST TIME-URGENT TARGETS LIKE THE SS-20, BUT THEY BELIEVE THAT A CRUISE MISSILE STATIONED IN EUROPE WITH A RANGE THAT COVERS PARTS OF THE SOVIET UNION WILL SERVE AS A THEATER DETERRENT OF CONSIDERABLE VALUE. THEY ALSO BELIEVE THAT SUCH MISSILES WILL OFFER TARGETING OPTIONS NOT NOW AVAILABLE, AS WELL AS RELIEVE AIRCRAFT OF CERTAIN MISSIONS.

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12. IN A NUTSHELL, THEREFORE, THE GERMANS FEAR THAT STRATEGIC PARITY WILL BE ACHIEVED AT THE EXPENSE OF THE THEATER BALANCE, AND THAT THE SOVIET CAPACITY TO EXPLOIT THE LATTER WILL MAKE THE FORMER IRRELEVANT.

NEGOTIATING TRADE-OFFS.

13. THE GERMANS TELL US INFORMALLY THAT THEY HAVE COMPLETED THEIR BASIC PAPERS ON THE STRATEGIC PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH THE SALT NEGOTIATIONS, BUT ARE FAR FROM COMPLETION OF THEIR DETAILED STUDIES. THE BASIC THRUST OF THOSE PAPERS IS ALREADY CLEAR, HOWEVER: IT IS TO TRY TO AVOID HAVING THE NEGOTIATING REQUIREMENTS NARROW THE STRATEGIC OPTIONS, AND TO TRY TO STRUCTURE THE NEGOTIATING TRADE-OFFS IN SUCH A WAY THAT NEW WESTERN WEAPONS CAN BE USED TO RELIEVE THE SOVIET PRESSURES AT THE THEATER AND CONVENTIONAL LEVEL.

14. BASED ON THEIR STILL INCOMPLETE STUDIES, IT APPEARS THAT THE GERMANS WANT TO USE THE CRUISE MISSILES AS A NEGOTIATING ASSET AGAINST THE SS-20'S AND PERHAPS THE BACKFIRE. THEY WANT TO TRY TO USE THEM, AT LEAST IN SOME MODE, AS A BARGAINING ASSET TO KEEP BALANCE AT THE THEATER LEVEL. THEY WANT TO USE THE ER/RB WEAPONS AS A NEGOTIATING TRADE-OFF AGAINST SOVIET TANKS, PERHAPS IN MBFR.

15. IT IS NOT CLEAR TO US, AND MAY NOT BE TO THEM, WHETHER THEY WOULD WANT TO INTRODUCE SOME OF THOSE TRADE-OFFS IN THE PRESENT NEGOTIATIONS OR IN A LATER GAS NEGOTIATION. WITH REGARD TO THE LATTER, THERE

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ARE ALSO CONSIDERABLE UNCERTAINTIES. FOR EXAMPLE, WE HAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THE CHANCELLERY IS MUCH MORE PREPARED TO INTRODUCE FBS INTO SOME FORM OF NEGOTIATIONS, PERHAPS IN GAS, THAN THE FOREIGN OFFICE.

16. IN GENERAL, THE GERMANS APPEAR TO BELIEVE THAT THE GAS TALKS SHOULD INCLUDE EVERYTHING THAT CAN HIT WESTERN EUROPE ON THE ONE HAND AS AGAINST EVERYTHING THAT IS DEPLOYED IN WESTERN EUROPE ON THE OTHER. (THEY FULLY RECOGNIZE THAT THE FRENCH CRUISE MISSILE COULD DISRUPT THIS CLEAR BALANCE.) THEY ALSO APPEAR TO FAVOR HAVING THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION AS THE SOLE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN GAS, WITH THE WESTERN ALLIES FORMING A CONSULTATIVE MECHANISM - PERHAPS UNDER NATO - THAT WOULD BACK UP THE NEGOTIATORS. WE ARE NOT SURE WHY THEY FAVOR THIS ARRANGEMENT. IT MAY BE BECAUSE OF THE MBFR EXPERIENCE, WHERE SQUABBLING ABOUT PARTICIPATION STALLED THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR SO LONG, OR BECAUSE THEY STILL FEEL UNCOMFORTABLE ABOUT NEGOTIATING NUCLEAR WEAPONS MATTERS DIRECTLY WITH THE SOVIET UNION.

IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVES IN CURRENT CONSULTATIONS

17. IT IS OUR IMPRESSION THAT THE GERMAN POSITION IN UPCOMING ALLIED CONSULTATIONS WILL BE ROUGHLY AS FOLLOWS:

-- IT SHOULD CONTINUE TO BE MADE CLEAR TO THE SOVIET UNION THAT, ONCE THE PROTOCOL EXPIRES, ALL QUESTIONS ARE OPEN. THEREFORE, ANY CRUISE MISSILE LIMITATIONS AGREED IN THE PROTOCOL WILL NOT BE SELF-PERPETUATING. IN CONNECTION WITH THIS, THEY MAY ASK MORE QUESTIONS THAN THEY HAVE TO DATE ABOUT THE VARIOUS ELEMENTS NOW BEING CONSIDERED FOR THE PROTOCOL.

-- THERE SHOULD BE NO NON-CIRCUMVENTION PROVISIONS THAT WOULD BLOCK TRANSFER OF CRUISE MISSILE TECHNOLOGY TO ALLIES (AND PERHAPS TO NATO).

-- CONSULTATIONS SHOULD INCLUDE EARLY AGREEMENT ON THE PRINCIPLES FOR SALT III THAT ARE TO BE INCLUDED IN OR RELATED TO THE SALT II ACCORD. IN THIS CON-

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NECTION, THEY MAY WANT TO INCLUDE A COMMITMENT TO GAS TALKS IN THE SALT III PRINCIPLES.

CURRENT WESTERN CONSULTATIONS

18. THE FRG WILL ALWAYS BE LESS RELAXED ABOUT THE CURRENT CONSULTATIONS THAN THE FRENCH OR BRITISH, FOR THE SIMPLE REASON THAT IT HAS NO OTHER OPTION. AT ONE POINT, THERE MAY HAVE BEEN SOME DISCUSSIONS AMONG EUROPEAN STATES ABOUT A EUROPEAN CRUISE MISSILE FORCE (WE HEARD SOME RUMORS OF IT, BUT WERE NEVER ABLE TO LEARN MORE). HOWEVER, NOW THAT THE FRENCH HAVE DECIDED TO BUILD THEIR OWN FORCE, THE LIKELIHOOD OF ANY BRITISH-GERMAN FORCE IS MINUSCULE. THEREFORE, THE FRG IS THE ONLY PARTICIPANT IN THE CONSULTATIONS WHO DOES NOT HAVE THE OPTION OF GOING IT ALONE. THE FRG HAS TO MAKE THE CONSULTATIONS WORK: THE OTHERS DO NOT.

19. BY THE SAME TOKEN, WE WOULD EXPECT THE GERMANS TO TAKE THE CONSULTATIONS MOST SERIOUSLY AND TO ATTEMPT TO BROADEN THEM AS WIDELY AS POSSIBLE. IN THIS EFFORT, THEY WILL BE SEVERELY HANDICAPPED BY A SHORTAGE OF GENUINE EXPERTISE IN DISARMAMENT MATTERS. THIS HAS ALREADY BEEN EVIDENT IN THE LENGTH OF TIME THAT IT HAS TAKEN THEM TO WORK OUT

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THEIR OWN POSITIONS AND TO DEVELOP NOTIONS OF WHAT THEY DO WANT - AS OPPOSED TO WHAT THEY DO NOT WANT.

20. ALTHOUGH WE ARE MORE EXPERT THAN THEY, IT ALSO APPEARS THAT THE FRG BASICALLY PREFERS BILATERAL TO TRILATERAL CONSULTATIONS. THE GERMANS TRIED HARD TO HAVE THE FRENCH PARTICIPATE, BUT WERE UNABLE TO PERSUADE THEM TO DO SO. THEY DO NOT FEEL FULLY COMFORTABLE WITH ONLY US AND THE BRITISH, IN PART BECAUSE NEITHER OF THE "ANGLO-SAXON" STATES ARE LOCATED ON THE CONTINENT. MOREOVER, THEY BELIEVE THAT BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS DO NOT APPEAR TO VIOLATE THE NATO DESIRE FOR COMMON ALLIANCE CONSULTATIONS AS MUCH AS TRILATERAL, AND CAN PERHAPS BE HANDLED MORE DISCREETLY.

THE POLITICAL IMPACT HERE

21. CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT'S GOVERNMENT FACES A DILEMMA OF ALMOST SCHIZOPHRENIC PROPORTIONS:

-- THE GERMANS CANNOT AFFORD TO HAVE SALT FAIL. IF

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IT DOES FAIL, AND IF US-SOVIET RELATIONS DETERIORATE, GERMAN DETENTE POLICY WILL BECOME IMPOSSIBLE TO SUSTAIN. ALTHOUGH SOVIET BEHAVIOR TO DATE SUGGESTS THAT THE SOVIET UNION WILL TRY TO CONTINUE A DETENTE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE FRG EVEN IF US-SOVIET RELATIONS DETERIORATE, THE DOMESTIC BASE FOR THE GERMAN SIDE OF SUCH A POLICY WILL WEAKEN IN THE FACE OF AN OPPOSITION ARGUMENT THAT BONN WAS PLAYING FOOTSIE WITH THE ENEMY OF GERMANY'S PRINCIPAL PROTECTOR.

-- IF A SALT AGREEMENT STABILIZES THE STRATEGIC BALANCE AT THE EXPENSE OF THE THEATER BALANCE, THE GERMANS CANNOT POSSIBLY RECREATE THE BALANCE THEMSELVES. ONLY A GOVERNMENT OF THE RIGHT CAN JUSTIFY

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OR SUSTAIN THE EXPENSE OF A CONVENTIONAL FORCE THAT COULD EVEN BEGIN TO LOOK AS IF IT COULD BALANCE EASTERN THEATER SUPERIORITY, AND EVEN THAT LEVEL OF CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENT WOULD MEAN LITTLE AGAINST A GENUINE SOVIET THREAT. ON THE OTHER HAND, NO SERIOUS GERMAN BELIEVES THAT THE FRG COULD GO NUCLEAR EXCEPT AT A HIDEOUS POLITICAL PRICE IN EAST AND WEST, A PRICE THAT WOULD RENDER MEANINGLESS ALL THAT GERMANS HAVE ACCOMPLISHED SINCE THE WAR.

22. THE GERMAN DILEMMA IS HISTORICAL: GERMANY CANNOT BE STRONG ENOUGH TO HOLD OFF RUSSIA EXCEPT AT A LEVEL WHICH WILL APPEAR - - AND PERHAPS BECOME - A THREAT TO OTHERS, OR BY DEVELOPING POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS THAT CAN INDEED MAKE IT SUCH A THREAT. THE US HAS SOLVED THIS DILEMMA FOR THIRTY YEARS, GIVING THE FRG SECURITY WITHOUT DOMINANCE OR EXTREMISM BY PROVIDING A NUCLEAR UMBRELLA THAT AFFORDS STRATEGIC DETERRANCE WHILE THE GERMANS PROVIDE THE PRINCIPAL CONVENTIONAL FORCE. THIS COMBINATION GAVE GERMANY AND EUROPE A STABILITY THAT HAS BEEN AT THE CENTER OF GERMAN AS WELL AS AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. SERIOUS GERMANS NOW WONDER, HOWEVER, IF THIS COMBINATION CAN BE SUSTAINED. ONE GERMAN PLANNER ASKED, RHETORICALLY, WHAT THE DOMESTIC IMPACT WOULD BE IF SOVIET THEATER AND CONVENTIONAL SUPERIORITY BECAME SO OVERWHELMING THAT A MUCH GREATER GERMAN ARMY BECAME ESSENTIAL IN PUBLIC EYES.

23. WHAT EVERY GERMAN CONNECTED WITH DEFENSE MATTERS HOPES, THEREFORE, IS THAT WE CAN NEGOTIATE A SALT ACCORD THAT WILL AVOID PURCHASING STRATEGIC PARITY AT THE EXPENSE OF THE THEATER BALANCE, IN THEIR EYES.

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MOREOVER, THEY BELIEVE THAT WE SHARE THE SAME WISH, AND THAT THE CONSULTATIONS WILL NOT REVEAL ANY DIFFERENCES IN OBJECTIVES BUT CAN CONCENTRATE ON HOW BEST TO ATTAIN THEM.
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